LEADING GENOMICS RESEARCHER RESIGNS FROM AU FOLLOWING THE UNIVERSITY’S DECISION TO STOP COLLABORATION WITH CHINA

Professor of gene technology Lars Bolund has worked at Aarhus University for over 40 years, but, in one month, he will leave his position. He has resigned from Aarhus University because the university has decided it can no longer collaborate with Chinese genomics research companies owing to what AU describes as “a change in the security landscape” and “the fear that data will be misused for unethical purposes”. The decision also means that AU researchers will no longer be allowed to collaborate with international genomics researchers who work with Chinese companies.

The decision affects several researchers at the Department of Biomedicine, many of whom collaborate with the Chinese company BGI – one of the world’s leading genomic organisations. Lars Bolund is one of them. Not only does he collaborate with BGI, but he also has his own BGI department in China, called the Lars Bolund Institute of Regenerative Medicine.

It was a taciturn Lars Bolund that Omnibus managed to connect with over the phone.

I’m utterly shocked that this can happen.

“I’ve resigned because of it. I have a contract until 2027, but if I’m not able to collaborate in the same way I have done for 48 years, there is no reason to stay here. I’d rather be laid off,” he said and expanded:

“I have always enjoyed working at AU, so I’m utterly shocked that this can happen. Everyone admits we’ve done nothing wrong, and neither has BGI. But still the university is banning us from collaborating,” said Lars Bolund, who didn’t wish to elaborate further.

PROFESSOR: THIS PUTS US IN AN AWKWARD POSITION

Another professor from the Department of Biomedicine who has been hit by the decision is Professor Yonglun Luo. He works closely with Lars Bolund and is the executive director of the Lars Bolund Institute at BGI – a position he is now leaving so that he can remain at AU. Several of Yonglun Luo’s projects at AU involve the sequencing technology developed at BGI, and he describes his collaboration with BGI as close and fruitful.

“This decision really affects us. We use BGI’s technology to re-sequence, and now we need to find alternative ways of doing this. BGI’s sequencing technology is good and cost-effective, and we’ve also gained expertise and experience in how to use it, which we will now lose,” he says.

For example, the institute has a sequencing instrument from BGI that it has been using for the past five years and which, according to Yonglun Luo, is important for his research. He is keen to point out that AU controls the instrument and the data it generates, and thus has full control over it.

There are too many unknowns in AU's announcement, thinks Yonglun Luo. For example, the decision creates even more challenges because it means that AU researchers are also not allowed to collaborate with international researchers who use BGI technologies.

"We are known for our ability to collaborate internationally, and in this area we are a world leader. But if we can't collaborate with BGI, we may not be able to attract international students, who may come from institutions where this collaboration is permitted. After all, other universities are still using BGI technology. If we can’t work with these universities, we will limit ourselves, and this will have a detrimental effect on many of our current projects. It will put us in an awkward position. We benefit from this international collaboration,” says Yonglun Luo.

However, Yonglun Luo stresses that it would be possible to find alternative sequencing partners in the future. He mentions the MOMA NGS Core Centre, which is a collaboration between Aarhus University Hospital's Department of Molecular Medicine and AU's Faculty of Health, which also offers genome sequencing.

DECISION WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

The new policy of not collaborating with China on genome sequencing was made by the senior management team and based on a recommendation by Kristian Thorn, university director, and Brian Vinter, chair of AU's URIS group (the Committee on guidelines for international research and innovation collaboration) and vice-dean for research at the Faculty of Technical Sciences.

AU is concerned about what Chinese companies might use genome sequencing for, explains Brian Vinter. For example, he mentions that China can use the data to identify different ethnic groups in society. The decision to stop collaborating with Chinese companies in this research area has been discussed with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Higher Education and Science, explains Brian Vinter. 

"Both the Ministry and the Security and Intelligence Service support our decision," he says. 

LINKS TO THE CHINESE MILITARY

There is no one particular event that led to the ban being introduced now, says Brian Vinter. The Department of Biomedicine informed its employees about the ban in an email, in which it put the ban down to “a change in the security landscape” and "the fear that data will be misused for unethical purposes".

BGI’s close ties to the Chinese state have also been covered in the media in recent years.

According to Reuters news agency, BGI has worked with the Chinese military to "improve population quality" and has applied its genetic research to help combat hearing loss and altitude sickness among soldiers.

Reuters also reports that BGI and the Chinese military have developed a prenatal test that gives BGI access to millions of women's genetic data. As part of a BGI study, data from Chinese women’s prenatal tests was used to single out Tibetan and Uyghur minorities from the data set and to find connections between their genes and their characteristics, Reuters claims.

Less than a month ago, a committee in the US House of Representatives advanced a bill – the Biosecure Act – to prohibit US partners collaborating with BGI and other Chinese biotech companies. The bill will now by considered by Congress and the Senate.

"This bill is a necessary step towards protecting America’s sensitive healthcare data from the CCP (Communist Party of China, ed.) before these companies become more embedded in the U.S. economy," says James Comer, who is a member of the House of Representatives and chair of the committee.

According to Reuters, BGI has announced that it will be forced to leave the US if the law is passed.

A NATO report from 2023, Science & Technology Trends 2023-2043, describes some of the ways that genomics could benefit the military in the future. These include the possibility of enhancing humans’ cognitive abilities, improving wound care, and aiding physical regeneration in warfare. The USA and China are a long way ahead of all other countries in the area of bio and human enhancement technologies, the NATO report concludes.

Last year, Politiken discussed the American military researcher Elsa B. Kania's report Minds at War, which contains statements from Chinese generals who predict what is often referred to as "intelligentized warfare" in the future, where brain research, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and re-optimisation will play a role.

In a Danish context, it is worth noting that BGI's European headquarters are located in Copenhagen. BGI moved into the Copenhagen Bio Science Park (COBIS) in 2012. Company founder Yang Huanming has close ties to Denmark, having completed his PhD at the University of Copenhagen. The company appealed to the fact that BGI managers had been educated and trained in Denmark and to the “close cultural and scientific ties between BGI and Denmark” to justify locating its European headquarters in Copenhagen.

The then Minister for Trade and Investment in 2012, Pia Olsen Dyhr, attended the opening ceremony and said she was pleased that BGI had invested in Denmark and, by doing so, had contributed to creating jobs in the country. She went on to say that Denmark needed to “increase its collaboration with China”, which MedWatch reported on in 2012.

From 2012 until the end of the project in 2017, AU was part of GenomeDenmark, which included BGI and which mapped the genome of 150 people in Denmark.

In another context, Lars Bolund told MedWatch in 2020 that he once borrowed computing power from the Chinese military.

VICE-DEAN: NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE MILITARY 

Head of AU's URIS group Brian Vinter recognises that the university is stopping collaboration in a research field that, until now, has worked closely with BGI in various ways. But the risk is too great, so the university made its decision with its "eyes wide open", he says. He also explains that the decision was not based on a fear that China would use the data to develop its military. 

“We are not concerned that China will use the data for military purposes. Whenever I ask people in Biomedicine about this threat, they tell me that it sounds like science fiction to them at this point. But if we stop collaboration now, we are at least doing it in good time, before our data could potentially be used to develop China’s army,” he says. 

LUO: WE’RE DOING BASIC RESEARCH THAT WILL BENEFIT PEOPLE

Professor Yonglun Luo understands AU's concerns about the misuse of human genome data, but he believes it’s an exaggeration to think that China will use research data for unethical purposes in the future.

People can speculate, but we researchers work with genetics to try to improve people’s health.

"People can speculate, but we researchers work with genetics to try to improve people’s health. We are aware of the concerns about what human data can be used for in years to come, but what we’re doing is basic research that will benefit people. Most of the sequencing-related studies we and the scientific community carry out are basic research and do not involve human genome data," says Yonglun Luo.

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT: WE’VE STARTED TO GIVE EQUIPMENT BACK TO BGI

Head of the Department of Biomedicine, Thomas G. Jensen, explains that the department is working hard to adapt to the new policy and to manage the situation for members of staff who work closely with BGI. He doesn’t yet have a complete picture of the implications of the university’s decision, because the situation is still developing. For reasons of staff policy, he cannot discuss how the decision will affect individual researchers.

But he can say that the department has already begun returning its sequencing equipment to BGI.

"We had a collaboration agreement with BGI which enabled us to borrow their sequencing instruments, and we are in the process of returning them. The projects we have run on this equipment are being transferred to different equipment. One of our researchers has spoken to BGI and said that they understood the situation very well. So it looks like we can handle this transition very amicably,” he says.

Some projects will now cost more to run, but he also believes that alternative solutions can be found.

“In some cases I think it will be more expensive than researchers thought it would be. But I haven't heard of any projects having to stop because of it," he says.

Thomas G. Jensen confirms that, according to the new policy, AU researchers are not allowed to collaborate with other researchers who work with BGI.

“This is stated in the decision by the senior management team, and we respect it. That's why we're trying to work out how we can ensure that our collaboration partners don’t use BGI either,” he explains.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR: WE MIGHT LOSE RESEARCH FUNDS WE’VE ALREADY DEPOSITED

Associate Professor Per Qvist from the Department of Biomedicine is head of the Bioinformatics Core Facility at the department, which helps researchers analyse sequence data. He says that the decision to stop collaboration with Chinese partners “will affect many of our users”.

One major problem is that several research teams have already deposited research funds with BGI and another Chinese company, Novogene, to use in future research projects. These funds typically exceed DKK 100,000 and, in the worst case, might simply be lost.

Now many of these teams have instead outsourced the sequencing part of their projects to the aforementioned MOMA NGS Core Center.

“I expect that they will take over as the primary supplier of NGS data (next generation sequencing data, ed.) to researchers at AU,” says Per Qvist.

BGI Europe did not responded to Omnibus’ request for an interview before the deadline for this article. If we’d been able to speak to them, we would have asked whether BGI collaborates or has collaborated with the Chinese state or the Chinese military and, if so, in what capacity. We would also have asked how their research data is stored and whether it can be accessed by the Chinese state.

Translated by Sarah Louise Jennings.